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COURT ADJUSTMENT OF LONG-TERM
CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS UNDER
MODERN CONTRACT LAW
ROBERT A. HILLMAN*
A manufacturer or utility, contemplating long-term energy needs,
enters a twenty-year fuel supply agreement. The buyer and supplier
agree on a base price, subject to periodic adjustment based on increased
costs of production. The agreement initially is satisfactory to both par-
ties. Then, due to an unanticipated event such as an oil embargo or high
inflation, costs dramatically rise and outpace the price-adjustment provi-
sion. Because continued performance will result in substantial losses, the
supplier proposes an adjustment of the price formula. The buyer refuses
to adjust and the supplier, preferring the uncertain results of litigation to
certain continuing losses, repudiates the agreement. The buyer then
seeks specific performance.'
A court may respond in a variety of ways to the problem posed by
these facts. It can hold the supplier to the contract by granting the buyer
specific performance or damages. Conversely, under the impracticability
doctrine, the court can excuse the supplier from performing.2 Or, it can
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1. Or, before the buyer brings an action, the supplier might bring an action seeking reforma-
tion of the contract or a finding of impracticability. The hypothetical is based loosely on Missouri
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865
(1979).
2. See Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); Northern
Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, vacated, 523 P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1974).
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grant relief based on a party's restitution or reliance interest.3 In the
alternative, the court can try to induce a settlement, for example, by de-
ferring any holding and ordering the parties to bargain further. Finally,
the court can adjust the contract, such as by modifying the terms of the
agreement and conditioning specific performance on acceptance of the
changes. Courts typically have followed the first approach, barring any
relief to the supplier.4 The last approach, court adjustment, has enjoyed
little judicial acceptance.5
Opposition to court adjustment is typically founded on one or more
of the following concerns. First, the supplier promised to perform a care-
fully planned agreement, and, therefore, assumed the risk of the onerous
circumstances. By adjusting the parties' well-planned agreement, courts
would threaten freedom of contract, produce uncertainty, and deter plan-
ning. 6 Second, even if the supplier were entitled to some relief, courts
lack sufficient information and expertise to determine precisely when ad-
justment is appropriate. 7 Again, the present approach-either the sup-
plier is excused or it must perform or pay damages-has the virtue of
certainty. Additional categories would only confuse. Third, in long-
term contract settings,8 courts have insufficient guidance on the appro-
priate terms of an adjustment, and, in any event, judges are personally ill-
3. See generally Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract A
Statutory Solution, 69 YALE LE. 1054, 1056-57 (1960).
4. See Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments UnderLong-Term Supply Contracts 76 Nw.
U.L, REv. 369, 376 (1981); see also Bernina Distribs., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d
434, 439-40 (10th Cir. 1981) (cost increases alone do not render contract impracticable court will
order specific performance).
5. Only one court has adjusted a long-term contract in a situation similar to the one described
in the opening problem. See Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa) v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. Pa. 1980). Some courts in dicta indicate that they might reform a contract in an appropriate
case. See, ,g. Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1984); Freldco, Ltd. v. Farmers
Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822, 830 n.9 (D. Del. 1981); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elem.
Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981); Iowa Elem. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 129, 135-36 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911
(1980); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 779-81 (W. Va. 1984); see also Macaulay, An Empircal
View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467-68.
Although court adjustment is relatively novel in our legal system, it is common in others. See,
,g., Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frusirated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L. REV. 1039 (1983).
6. See, ,g., Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 999 n.5 (N.D. I11. 1981); see also
Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Communications Union, Local No. 56,
584 F. Supp. 990, 998 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
7. See Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. REV.
1, 31 (1984).
8. I will not attempt to define precisely the necessary duration of a "long-term" contract.
Rather, the problem arises whenever the contract is formed against the backdrop described infra at
notes 21-29 and accompanying text. I refer to long-term contracts here only because contracts of
relatively long duration are most likely to be formed with the informality and expectations offlexibil-
ity described infra.
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equipped to adjust complex commercial contracts.9 The results would be
haphazard, and, again, would deter planning.10 Fourth, court adjust-
ment would be bad policy, for example, because it would increase the
costs of contracting by causing parties to draft around the rule of adjust-
ment, thus deterring some parties from entering long-term ar-
rangements."
In this article, I analyze when, if ever, court adjustment is appropri-
ate. I argue that the supplier is entitled to some form of relief in at least
some situations, that these situations can be identified with sufficient pre-
cision, that courts have adequate tools to shape appropriate relief, and
that court adjustment is good policy in limited, but distinct, circum-
stances.12 In Part I, I identify two situations in which court adjustment
is appropriate. The first situation calling for adjustment, the "agreement
model," occurs when the supplier reasonably expects the buyer to adjust
in case of a serious disruption. The buyer's failure to adjust is a breach of
contract. The agreement model accounts for the "relational" realities of
many contract settings through a theory of the parties' implicit risk allo-
cation.13 The second situation calling for adjustment, the "gap model,"
occurs when the supplier has no reasonable expectation of adjustment,
but the parties simply fail to allocate the risk of some calamitous event.
The supplier will suffer substantial harm from continued performance,
but the buyer has materially relied on that performance. The gap model
is based primarily on the fairness principle that the parties should agree
to share unallocated losses.14
In Part II, I argue that when a court identifies a situation ripe for
court adjustment, that remedy should not be abandoned on impractical-
ity or policy grounds. I therefore discuss possible approaches to court
adjustment and respond to the criticisms outlined above.15 Because a
remedy should be as certain and simple as possible, I conclude that in
9. Dawson, supra note 7, at 17-18, 36-37.
10. Id. at 31.
11. See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
12. Others have written about the problem of court adjustment. The leading article in support
of court adjustment is Speidel, supra note 4. This article differs from Professor Speide's excellent
work in three ways. First, I develop an agreement model which justifies court adjustment (hence I
refer to court adjustment rather than court-imposed adjustment), whereas Professor Speidel relied
on a gap model almost exclusively. See infra notes 17-73 and accompanying text. Second, I respond
to criticism of conrt adjustment generated by Professor Speidel's thoughtful piece. See infra notes
98-166 and accompanying text. For articles critical of adjustment, see Dawson, supra note 7, and
Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-TenM Contract 69 MINN. L. REV.
521 (1985). Third, I analyze more fully the kinds of relief appropriate in court adjustment.
13. See infra notes 17-73 and accompanying text; see also Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution
to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 545, 547-48.
14. See infra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98-166 and accompanying text.
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many situations court adjustment should be limited to adjustment of the
duration of the agreement. Using the contract-law response to the prob-
lem of terminable-at-will franchise agreements as a model, I suggest that
supply contracts should continue only for a period sufficient to enable the
buyer to recoup its reliance expenses. 6
I. RECOGNITION OF A DUTY TO ADjuST
A. The Agreement Model
Because most contracting parties are aware that conditions may
change during the course of their agreement and that allocating all risks
is impossible, too costly, or unnecessary, 17 many long-term contracts ex-
pressly require adjustment of terms in light of changed circumstances.
For example, some coal contracts include a "gross inequities adjustment
provision," which requires the parties to negotiate in good faith to re-
solve "inequities" resulting from economic conditions that the parties did
not contemplate at the time they made their agreement.18 Alternatively,
the parties may expressly agree that the price or other provision is merely
a projection and is subject to further negotiation.19 In either case, when
the supplier seeks negotiation under the flexibility-preserving term, the
supplier is attempting to perform the contract, not avoid it. The buyer's
refusal to bargain would be a breach. 20
Even if the supply contract contains no express agreement to adjust,
the circumstances existing at the time of contracting may demonstrate
that the parties intended such a duty. Consider the following typical
backdrop to long-term contracting. The parties enjoy relatively equal
bargaining strength, are familiar with each other, and have previously
dealt with each other. The subject matter of the contract, although not
16. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
17. On the limits of planning, see Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contract in the Manufac-
turing Industry, PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 13, 17-18.
18. These provisions are common in long-term contracts. See Goldberg, Price Adjustment in
Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 527, 529 n.5; Joskow, VerticalIntegration and Long-Term
Contracts. The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, I .L. EcON. & ORGANzATiON 33,
73 (1985). In coal contracts a "market reopener" provision is also common. Such a provision typi-
cally allows either party to notify the other that the contract price is inconsistent with the market
pricm After notice, the parties must negotiate in good faith for an adjustment or, failing to agree, go
to arbitration. Scott, Coal SupplyAgreements, 23 Rocy MTN. MIN. L. INsr. 107, 131-32 (1977).
19. Cf Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9 (4th Cir. 1971) (evidence of
trade usage allowed to show parties intended adjustment of price, quantity, and delivery terms in
adverse market).
20. See Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract Modification
Under Article Two, 59 N.C.L. REv. 335, 33843 (1981); see also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 3.29, at 202 (1982). Of course, determining whether a buyer refused to bargain will be difficult in
many circumstances. See infra note 92.
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involving a standardized commodity, is also not unusual (for example,
the sale of coal). The parties are therefore comfortable with little formal-
ity.21 In addition, the parties want to continue to deal with each other
because they are aware of the costs of finding a market substitute after
investing in a relationship 22 and after forming understandings that lower
the cost of doing business. 23 In short, the parties want to continue a
profitable relationship24 and maintain their goodwill and reputation in
their industry 2
Such parties to long-term contracts also are interested in ensuring a
supply or a market at a reasonable price, not in making wagers about
market shifts.26 Although they expect disruptions during the course of
the agreement, the parties do not attempt to plan for nebulous risks, and
they may even fail to allocate some foreseeable but remote risks because
allocation costs too much27 or may rock the boat.28 Put another way,
21. Professor Macaulay has written that:
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important long-term
continuing business relations. Business people often do not plan, exhibit great care in
drafting contracts, pay much attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a
legal approach to business relationships. There are business cultures defining the risks
assumed in bargains, and what should be done when things go wrong.
Macaulay, supra note 5, at 467. See also infra note 45; Whitford, supra note 13, at 551 (parties
rarely negotiate all terms of relationship at origin of contract).
22. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economic" The Governance of Contractual Relation; 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); see also Palay, A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985 Wis. L. Rlv.
561, 562-63; Speidel, supra note 4, at 373-74; Whitford, supra note 13, at 550.
23. See Whitford, supra note 13, at 550.
24. See Macaulay, supra note 5, at 467 ('People perform disadvantageous contracts today be-
cause often this gains credit that they can draw on in the future."); see also Gordon, Macaulay,
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 569
(under relational view of contract, parties cooperate during unexpected contingencies to preserve
long-term relationship); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busines A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55, 62-65 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations] (litigation en-
tails serious expense and parties may wish to continue profitable business relationship in future).
25. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 66-67 (1980); Beale & Dugdale, Contracts
Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 45, 47
(1975); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 24, at 62-65.
26. Professor Goldberg states that, with the exception of commodities sales, "[f]irms do not
generally enter into multi-year contracts because of their concern for the future course of prices.
Rather, they entcr into the agreements to achieve the benefits of cooperation." Goldberg, supra note
18, at 531.
27. One incentive for price-adjustment features, according to Professor Goldberg, is to avoid
wasteful searching for information on future costs and prices. Price-adjustment features reduce the
value of information as to the future and hence discourage costly searches. See id. at 532. Goldberg
also asserts that price-adjustment features avoid costs resulting when the "loser" in a fixed-price
contract engages in conduct such as insisting on strict compliance with quality standards or other-
wise "reads the contract literally." Id.
28. See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 25, at 47. Professor Palay has suggested that parties with
"strong relational ties" do not worry about a contract's initial terms. Instead, they assume that the
contract will be adjusted in light of changed circumstances. See Palay, supra note 22, at 562 ('Since
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both parties can increase mutual gains from the contract by remaining
flexible after signing the contract, thereby saving costs related to plan-
ning for risks and bickering after contract breakdown.29
With these relational realities explicit, the issue is whether the agree-
ment, although silent on the duty to adjust in exigent circumstances, in-
cludes such a duty. In some situations, the answer is "yes." 30 First, the
circumstances may support a finding of a trade custom of adjustment,31
or previous adjustments between the buyer and the supplier may consti-
tute a course of dealing32 or a course of performance. 33 The Uniform
Commercial Code encourages resort to such evidence in interpreting the
parties' agreement on the theory that, unless excluded, the parties in-
tended to incorporate the trade custom, course of dealing, or course of
performance. 34 Thus, although silent on adjustment, an agreement may
the costs of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing a once-and-for-all agrcement outweigh the benefits,
it is far more efficient to cross bridges as they are reached.").
29. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 532; see also Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a
RelationalSociety, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 572-73 (1983) ('In sustained and inextricable relations a
principal use of contracts is to provide a basisfor renegotiations once a defective performance occurs."
(emphasis in original)); Palay, supra note 22, at 562.
30. See Goetz& Scott, The Limits ofExpanded Choice: An Analysis ofthe InteractionsBetween
Express andImplied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 261,277 n.47 (1985) ("[Ujnofficial or other
context-generated understandings might be legally enforceable, implied terms.").
31. A trade custom is "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance
... as to justify an expectation that it will be observed." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1977). A trade custom
need not be "ancient or immemorial"; a new custom observed regularly in the trade is sufficient
because it is likely to be adopted by the parties. See R. HILLMAN, . MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES,
COMMON LAW AND EQuITy UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE fT 3.0712][a][], at 3-34
(1985).
32. A course of dealing is defined as a "sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a commou basis of understanding
for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1977). For applications of
the principle that a course of dealing can affect contract interpretation, see Nanakuli Paving & Rock
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 796 (9th Cir. 1981); and Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster
Co., 451 F.2d 3, 7-11 (4th Cir. 1971).
In their study of 19 engineering manufacturers in Bristol, England, Beale and Dugdale found
that the manufacturers' contracts of sale and purchase were largely "tacit," in that certain terms,
customs, and "unwritten" laws were widely accepted (for example, certain buyer losses would not be
compensated). Beale & Dugdale, supra note 25, at 47.
33. U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1977) provides:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party
with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the
other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be rele-
vant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
34. The UCC focuses on the parties' bargain in fact, as found in the written agreement and in
course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance. Id § 1-201(3). See also Nanakuli Pav-
ing & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 796-805 (9th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases); American
Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Camp-
bell v. Hostetter Farms, Inc., 251 Pa. Super. 232, 237-39, 380 A.2d 463, 466 (1977). See generally
Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course ofDealing Subversion of the UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. LF. 811.
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require it. Again, a refusal to adjust would be a breach? 5
Apart from any duty based on trade custom, course of dealing, or
course of performance, a party may have a good-faith duty to adjust.36
In problems of performance, good faith requires "cooperation on the part
of one party to the contract so that another party will not be deprived of
his reasonable expectations."37 In our example, then, performance by
the buyer contrary to the supplier's reasonable expectations is in bad
faith. The supplier's argument is that, as a result of the circumstances at
or after the time of contracting, each party reasonably expected the other
to act consistently with its interests by being flexible and cooperating to
preserve the relationship when serious trouble arose.38
Adjustment often may be precisely what the parties expect. The
best way to maintain an informal, harmonious relationship, preserve
goodwill and reputation, and protect one's investment is to remain flexi-
ble and avoid disputes and litigation. 39 Indeed, disagreements in long-
Reliance on trade custom and the like to determine the parties' intentions is by no means
novel-it is part of a "new spirit of contract." See Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 3.L. &
COM. 193, 199-200 (1982).
35. Evidence of trade custom and the like can supplement agreements, explain them, or even
change the literal meaning of express terms. See R. HuxmAN, L McDoNNELL & S. NicLEs,
supra note 31, 1 3.07[2][a][i], at 3-35; see also Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd, 739 F.2d
1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (evidence of trade custom may give rise to binding contract provision,
overriding contrary UCC "gap-filler" provision); American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson
Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 596-98 (Min. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of trade usage and course of
dealing admissible to show that delivery dates were estimates, despite "time of the essence" clause).
36. A practice of adjusting may not yet have ripened into a trade custom, for example, because
of insufficient regularity of observance; the particular parties nevertheless may expect the practice to
be observed. Furthermore, a court may not yet have recognized the trade custom so that it has not
become an "implied term for all transactions within the relevant category." Goetz & Scott, supra
note 30, at 278.
37. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666, 669 (1963).
38. One "informality" in many long-term agreements is the limited use of dispute resolution
clauses. Business people are reluctant to negotiate concerning an appropriate dispute resolution
clause when future problems are uncertain or are supposed to be settled amicably. Most commercial
contracts thus contain no dispute resolution clause, although some contain bollerplate arbitration
clauses. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 540-41 (1985). The
absence of a dispute resolntion clause therefore should not lead to the conclusion that the parties did
not expect flexibility or expected a promisor to perform under all circumstances.
39. A consultant to the fertilizer industry testified as follows in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v.
Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971):
Q What has been your experience in the [fertilizer] industry with reference to [the quan-
tity specified in the contract]? Are these contracts for fixed amounts, are they enforced
[sic] to buy them?
A Ordinarily not because you want to sell him again next year. You never force him to
take his contract tonnage.
Appendix and Exhibits at 169, reproduced in Kirst, supra note 34, at 847 n.88.
Because each contracting party is likely to make significant investments in its long-term con-
tract, each becomes vulnerable to "strategic" behavior by the other party when unallocated contin-
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term settings are most often settled without pursuing legal remedies.4°
Contracting parties view their obligations as growing not only out of the
contract, but also out of the norms of their relationship such as coopera-
tion and compromise.4 1 As Karl Llewellyn long ago pointed out, the
written contract is only a "rough indication around which [real working]
relations vary."42 For example, when confronted with large cost in-
creases, one coal supplier recently requested relief from more than forty
utilities. Only two utilities balked, and the contract of one of those that
refused had less than a year to run.4 3
Obviously, not every contract raises a duty to adjust if something
goes awry. If the scenario is not what I have described-for example, if
the agreement is a large one-time deal involving a standardized commod-
ity-a reasonable party might not expect the other to adjust.44 In addi-
gencies arise. Both parties, therefore, have an interest in agreeing to a procedure to allocate such
risks when they do arise. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 249; see also Palay, supra note 22, at
562-63.
40. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations; supra note 24, at 62 (business persons
have their own norms and do not rely on legal rules).
41. See, eg., Beale & Dugdale, supra note 25, at 47-48 (belief in mutual fairness and desire to
conduct transactions in future create norms in contractual dealings).
42. Llewellyn, Vhat Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspectve 40 YALE L. 704, 737 (1931).
See also Lipton, Contract and Uncertainty, I CARDozo L. REv. 449, 450-51 (1979) ("Contract...
represents a constant coming to terms, an expression of an ongoing relationship, a congruence of
interests continuing over time.").
43. See Brief for Peabody Coal Co. at 21, Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583
S.W.2d 721 (Mo. CL App.), cerA denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). The supplier requested monthly
instead of semiannual adjustments of the price of coal according to the contract's price escalation
provision. I. at 20-21. See also North Cent. Airlines v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582, 585
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that many of Continental's customers voluntarily accepted price increases
during oil crisis of 1970's).
Obviously, if the supplier is driven out of business or into bankruptcy and therefore cannot
continue to supply the buyer, this will not in most cases serve the buyer's interests. See, ag, Macau-
lay, Elegant Models, Empirical Rcturs, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'y REV.
507, 516 (1977) (observing that buyers of uranium from Westinghouse Electric Corporation have an
interest in Westinghouse remaining solvent, because someone must provide engineering, parts, and
service for reactors); see also Scott, supra note 18, at 124 ('Buyers have... frequently recognized the
wisdom of reasonable escalators, as they are interested in having a coal supplier which is able to
continue to operate the mine at a reasonable profit level."). Professor Dawson observed that
although Westinghouse faced losses of over two billion dolla=s in its agreements to supply uranium
for 49 nuclear power plants due to sharp market increases in the price of uranium, and although the
trial judge believed Westinghouse was not entitled to relief, the creditors "motivated presumably by
their own self-interest in preserving it as a fully functioning enterprise, agreed to settlements that
were vastly more lenient than any that a court would have been bold enough to propose." Dawson,
supra note 7, at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
44. Professor Goldberg has suggested that in contracts for future delivery of commodities
traded in "thick markets" the parties typically would not include price adjustment features or permit
the disadvantaged to seekjudicial relief. Nevertheless, "[t]he more isolated the exchange is from the
market, the more likely it is that the parties would find price adjustment efficacious." Galdberg,
supra note 18, at 543. See also Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics The Governance ofRail
Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 279-85 (1984) (statistical study shows specialized
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tion, even if adjustment of terms in the face of unanticipated
circumstances is customary in the trade, the parties have adjusted in the
past, or the parties expect to adjust in the future, they may view adjust-
ment as a matter of comity-i.e., as a "favor" that may be returned, not
as something required under the law of their contract.45 In short, these
parties may believe they have the legal right to refuse to adjust, although
in practical terms they believe they will adjust. The parties view contract
law as a club held in reserve but infrequently used.46
When the parties view adjustment only as a matter of comity,47 a
buyer would have the right to refuse to adjust. Suppose, however, that
the parties contract under circumstances creating an expectation of flexi-
bility,48 without acknowledging the contract club. Under traditional ob-
jective assent theory of contract formation,49 the club is lost, and a duty
to adjust arises ; at the time of contracting or thereafter,50 a party rea-
agreements much more open to adjustment than nonspecialized agreements); Evan, Comment, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 67, 68 (1963) (the greater the bargaining power discrepancy, the less likely a norm of
flexibility and renegotiation).
45. These are apparently the circumstances of television production agreements. A contract
between a network and program producer typically calls for supplying programming (such as a
television series) for a number of years with an option for additional years. The contract usually
includes provisions for increasing the producer's fee, but only for limited contingencies such as in-
dustry-wide increases in laboratory costs. The actors' salaries, paid by the producer, are initially
generally low because the success of the series is unknown, but there is a general understanding that
the actor and producer will renegotiate if the series is a hit. And although the agreement between
the producer and network includes no provision for an increase in fees due to increased actors'
salaries or generally due to the success of the show, a "practice" has developed to renegotiate fees on
these bases. See Thompson, The Prime Time Crime, ENT. Li., Summer 1982, at 1; Letter from
Dixon Q. Dew, a lawyer in the television industry for more than 20 years, to Robert A. Hillman
(Aug. 5, 1985); see also Kirst, supra note 34, at 848-49 (noting custom of similar flexibility of con-
tract terms in the fertilizer industry).
Beale and Dugdale's study found that the spirit of trust and the desire to maintain a reputation
required that "[elach side had to be prepared to make concessions and to do so in a spirit of co-
operation." Beale & Dugdale, supra note 25, at 48. Nevertheless, contract law was an "umbrella"
under which the parties operated.
46. See Macaulay, supra note 17, at 15-16.
47. This "comity" view is how the matter of adjustment was described in the letter from Dixon
Q. Dem to Robert A. Hiffman, supra note 45.
48. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
49. See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 388, 105 S.W.
777, 778 (1907) ("In so far as their intention is an influential element, it is only such intention as the
words or acts of the parties indicate not one secretly cherished which is inconsistent with those
words or acts.").
50. If a party's reasonable expectations of adjustment are based on circumstances arising after
contract formation, such as repeated instances in which the other party does not insist on perform-
ance according to the letter of the contract, the express term may be waived or a course of perform-
ance established. As to the former, a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. Some courts
require consideration to support a waiver, see, ag., Voelker v. Joseph, 62 Wash. 2d 429, 435, 383
P.2d 301, 306 (1963), while others do not. See, eg., Carfi v. De Martino, 181 Misc. 428, 430, 46
N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Consideration for the buyer's waiver of the right to insist on
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sonably believes that no legal club is available. Courts should not over-
look the possibility of such reasonable expectations in the long-term
contract setting by uniformly holding a party to a written price (or other)
term.51
A duty to adjust, therefore, can override express contract terms such
as fixed-price terms or even price-adjustment formulas, provided that the
parties reasonably expect those terms to yield to the implied duty.52 The
amount of bargaining over a particular express provision and the parties'
purpose in including the provision are obviously critical in determining
whether adjustment trumps an express provision. For example, in Mis-
souri Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,53 a coal supplier sought in
contract negotiations to use the Consumer Price Index as an index for
adjusting the price for increased production costs. The electrical utility
insisted on using the Industrial Commodity Index. The parties adopted
the Industrial Commodity Index, but it failed to keep pace with the sup-
performance without adjustment can be found in the suppliers agreement not to insist on the buyer's
performance in circumstances exigent to the buyer (i.e., to be flexible itself); the supplier's reliance
on the waiver can be found in the suppliers forgoing opportunities to deal with other more flexible
buyers.
In the Beale and Dugdale study of engineering manufacturers' contracts of sale, the authors
found that sellers often gave "informal" extensions of credit to large and regular customers by, for
example, permitting the buyers to pay one month late. See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 25, at 51.
Under the law of waiver, the sellers may have lost the right to insist on performance on time. See,
eg., Margolin v. Franklin, 132 I1. App. 2d 527, 530-31, 270 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (1971).
For a discussion of course of performance, see supra note 33 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-208 (1977)).
51. The parol evidence rule should be no hurdle to the admissibility of the requisite evidence.
Most of the evidence will be objective evidence admissible under U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1977). Evidence
such as the parties' subjective views on the degree of flexibility built into the contract should be
admissible because the parties did not intend the writing to be complete on this point. See Id. § 2-
202. In addition, the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of a course of performance or of a
waiver subsequent to contract formation.
52. Cf Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 7 n.3 (4th Cir. 1971) (m the
fertilizer industry, parties do not feel bound to contracts that become unappealing due to changes in
market conditions).
Columbia Nitrogen is perhaps the leading case in which a court admitted evidence of a trade
usage contradicting a written term. See also Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d
772, 791-92, 797 (9th Cir. 1981); Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v. Chase Nat'1 Bank, 144 F.2d 759, 762 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945); American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg.
Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 597-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). But see Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v.
Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 582-85 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (although parties did not
stipulate in contract that trade usage would not apply, parol evidence inadmissible since parties had
no prior dealings and contract set out specific terms), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978); State ex
rel Nichols Mach. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 100 N.M. 440, 444, 671 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct.
App.) (parol evidence inadmissible when specific contract terms "leave no room for a contrary con-
struction consistent with Contractor's claimed usage of trade"), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670 P.2d
581 (1983).
53. 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
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plier's costs.54 The price formula selected by the parties was thus a dick-
ered term, suggesting that the parties did not intend to change the term
later.
Even in such situations, the parties may not have intended a price
formula to govern adjustment when the cost increase is extreme, espe-
cially if the index used does not appear to work the way the parties in-
tended. The parties may have designed the formula to ensure the
supplier a recovery of its costs plus a reasonable profit, and to protect the
utility from uncapped price increases under foreseeable conditions.
Thus, both parties may have used such a feature to limit their risks. But
when costs dramatically outpace the price formula, and the formula does
not limit the supplier's risks, the provision may not apply because the
parties did not intend it to apply. Instead, assuming the circumstances
otherwise support a reasonable expectation of adjustment, the parties
have a duty to adjust the price provision.
Although it fails to discuss the adjustment duty, Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa) v. Essex Group, Inc. 55 is an example of a case in which a
price formula apparently failed to achieve the parties' goal of limiting
their risks. The parties agreed to refer to the Wholesale Price Index-
Industrial Commodities (WPI) to adjust the noulabor production costs
borne by Alcoa in converting alumina to aluminum for Essex.5 6 The
price formula included a ceiling on how much Essex would be required
to pay, but no floor. The WPI failed to reflect unanticipated cost in-
creases due to oil price inflation and pollution control, causing Alcoa a
projected loss of over sixty million dollars for the remainder of the con-
tract.57 Alcoa argued that the WPI did not work as the parties intended
and that relief was appropriate.53
The district court 'agreed. In its view, the issue was whether the
parties intended the WPI to apply regardless of the circumstances, or
whether they intended the index to apply only within a range of potential
cost fluctuations, with additional adjustments to be made through further
bargaining when the range was exceeded. Weighing all the circum-
54. The supplier, unable to obtain an adjustment, sought relief under UCC section 2-615 (im.
practicability), but the court denied relief because losses resulted from foreseeable economic trends
and did not alter the "essential nature of the performance." IM at 728 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-615
comment 4 (1977)).
55. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
56. IaM at 58.
57. Id. at 58, 73.
58. Id. at 56. Nonlabor production costs more than tripled from 1973 to 1978 (5.8 cents to
22.7 cents per pound), while the WPI less than doubled. ld at 59. Although the court was unclear
on how it determined the extent of Alcoa's losses, Professor Goldberg suggests that the court's
estimate is irrelevant. More important is Alcoa's loss of the chance to sell to someone else. This loss
was over $20 million just in the year suit was brought. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 536.
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stances, the court found that the parties intended the latter.5 9 Especially
persuasive to the court was the fact that the parties were "huge industrial
enterprises" with highly trained, sophisticated managements.6° Such
parties plainly sought to limit their risks, as evidenced by other contract
provisions such as the "elaborate 'force majeure' clauses" and the "care
and expense" of the negotiations and drafting.61 In addition, Alcoa pro-
posed the WPI only after determining that the WPI had "closely
tracked" Alcoa's nonlabor production costs for years and was likely to
do so in the future.62 Some of this evidence may not be highly persua-
sive, and perhaps when a court encounters a detailed price provision the
initial assumption should be that the parties intended it to apply in all
circumstances. Nevertheless, the court should not preclude the supplier
from showing otherwise.63
A foreseeability test may help in determining whether a duty to ad-
just arises. For example, we can assume that parties to a long-term con-
tract intend that any detailed price-adjustment formula apply to readily
foreseeable circumstances-after all, why else draft such a provision?
Suppose, however, that the supply contract contains a fixed-price term.
Some courts assume that absent an express allocation of risk, the parties
must have intended to assign all foreseeable risks to the supplier 4 As
we have seen, however, the parties may have failed to allocate even fore-
seeable risks;65 the parties may have decided that a carefully negotiated
allocation of risks would not suit their interests. They may, for example,
have thought that such a contract would be insufficiently flexible or
would sour a prosperous relationshipA6 The parties also may have deter-
mined that further negotiation about risk allocation would not be cost-
effective.67 Supporting these determinations may be the expectation that
if the risk comes to pass, the parties will cooperate to deal with it. In a
fixed-price contract, then, there is no persuasive reason why even foresee-
able risks must fall automatically on a party rather than trigger an ad-
59. Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 68-70.
60. Id. at 68.
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. Id. at 69.
63. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 109-10 (Ct. Cl. 1964)
(seller's acceptance of fixed-price contract did not suggest assumption of all risks), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 962 (1965).
64. See, eg., Raner v. Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 441, 155 N.E. 733, 734 (1927); see also Hill-
man, An Analysts of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L REv. 617, 625 (1983).
65. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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justment duty.68 In fact, these arguments concerning the fallibility of the
foreseeability test suggest that even a price-adjustment formula may not
be designed to allocate some foreseeable but remote and harmful risks.
Assuming that an implied agreement to adjust exists in some cir-
cumstances, we still must determine what magnitude of disruption would
trigger the duty. As in most areas of the ]aw (including the current ap-
proach to the impracticability doctrine), no precise line can be drawn.
Still, some guidance is possible. Generally, the greater the disruption,
the greater the likelihood that a duty to adjust will arise. For example,
express provisions calling for an adjustment often require "gross inequi-
ties." In such situations, the parties would view performance of the con-
tract without an adjustment as ultimately detrimental to both sides.
Obviously, in many cases it will not serve the buyer's interests if the sup-
plier is driven out of business or to bankruptcy and therefore cannot con-
tinue to supply the buyer. 69 The implied adjustment duty should be no
less stringent. In fact, the potential harm to a party must approximate
that of a party who historically has been excused from performance
under the impracticability doctrine.70 In such cases, the law correctly
assumes that the parties did not allocate the particular risk to the prom-
isor and that compelled performance according to the contract would
neither reflect the parties' intent nor further any social values.71 How-
ever, the circumstances that give rise to the supplier's reasonable expec-
tation that the buyer will adjust may also give rise to a reasonable
expectation on the part of the buyer that the supplier will also seek to
preserve the relationship. Thus, the supplier may have a duty to adjust
as well, rather than claim an excuse from all performance. The supplier's
duty to adjust is especially likely to exist when the buyer has a substantial
reliance interest in continued performance, such as when a utility builds
a new power station in anticipation of a steady supply of fuel, or forgoes
68. See Hillman, supra note 64, at 625. Courts applying the foreseeability test must also deter-
mine whether a contingency was foreseeable. All commercial contingencies may be foreseeable to
some extent; a more realistic question is how foreseeable was the occurrence. See Aluminum Co. of
Am. (Alcoa) v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (the "proper question" is
whether the parties believed an outcome was "highly unlikely"). The greater the foreseeability, the
more likely the parties' price provision was intended to take care of the contingency. Because deter-
mining the extent of foreseeability requires difficult line drawing, one suspects that other factors
often control the foreseeability determination. For example, a court may find that calamitous cost
increases due to an oil boycott were unforeseeable, while less drastic increases were foreseeable. See
Hilman, supra note 64, at 625.
69. See supra note 43.
70. Typically courts require close to a 100% increase in costs. See Hillman, supra note 64, at
652 nn.219-20.
71. See, eg&, id at 650-55.
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other favorable supply opportunities, or makes commitments contingent
on the supply of fuel.
The argument under the agreement model in favor of a good-faith
duty to adjust in certain chcumstances is thus based on the realities of
business expectations. As such, the argument is vulnerable to the criti-
cism that contract law should not necessarily reflect the "morals of the
marketplace." 72  Certainly, patently unfair practices, such as a
merchant's unconscionable behavior toward a consumer in adhesion con-
tract situations, should be regulated. When, however, the parties' prac-
tices consist not of advantage-taking, but of sharing and cooperation, and
both parties intended to incorporate such practices, enforcing the ac-
cepted mores should be encouraged.
In sum, a host of factors are pertinent to determining the parties'
intentions with respect to adjustment. Extreme cases in which the par-
ties' intentions are perfectly clear are rarely litigated. Courts face a chal-
lenge here in sorting out the cases, but the problem is not unlike other
contract interpretation issues73 and requires only close attention to the
realities of business practice that define the parties' agreement. We
should not concede defeat, therefore, by refusing to recognize a duty to
adjust when the circumstances prove the existence of such a duty.
B. The "Gap" Model.
The principal justification for an adjustment duty under the agree-
ment model derives from the principle of freedom of contract. 74 There is
often a fine line, however, between enforcing the parties' intentions and
72. Richard Danzig suggests that the focus in article two of the UCC on reflecting commercial
realities is a "renunciation of legislative responsibility and power." Danzig, A Comment on the Juris-
prudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 622 (1975). On the other hand,
because commercial practices are the foundation on which the parties bargained, reliance on these
practices leads to enforcement of the parties' true expectations and bars surprise. See Kirst, supra
note 34, at 870 (consideration of trade usage and course of dealing provides some assurance that
courts will consider actual dispute between parties); Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the
Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1106-07 (1965) (UCC
uses "trade usage" to determine parties' probable intent); Llewellyn, supra note 42, at 722 n.45
(practice is the "base-line" for measuring parties' obligatious). As one pre-UCC court stated:
"[When tradesmen say or write anything, they are perhaps without present thought on the subject,
writing on top of a mass of habits or usages which they take as a matter of course." Nicoll v.
Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 F. 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1920). In addition, while law remains fixed, trade
practice is flexible and changing. Llewellyn, supra note 42, at 714.
73. See Hillman, supra note 64, at 623-27 (discussing courts' approaches to the problem of
allocating risks not dealt with by the contract in order to determine whether a right of cessation
exists).
74. Freedom of contract protects the parties' autonomy, and maximizes both the parties' and
society's welfare. See E. FARNSWORTI, supra note 20, § 1.7, at 21; C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROM-
isE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBUGATION 2 (1981); Cohen, The Basfs of Contract, 46 HARv.
L. REv. 553, 575 (1933).
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judicial gap filling, especially when those intentions are gleaned from the
circumstances rather than an express agreement. An independent justifi-
cation exists, however, for an adjustment duty in some cases in which the
evidence is insufficient to find an express or implied agreement to ad-just.75 The duty is based on the desirability of requiring the parties to
share unallocated losses.76
The realities of planning77 suggest that a particular risk, such as an
oil embargo or runaway inflation, may be unallocated. If parties explic-
itly or implicitly agree not to deal with such a problem because it is too
remote, too costly to provide for, or too likely to upset the deal, there is
little reason based on the agreement for placing the risk solely on either
party.7 8 Although contracts are entered for the purpose of ensuring per-
formance in an unpredictable future, reasonable parties often do not ex-
pect a promisor to act as an insurer by performing regardless of
calamitous circumstances. 79 This is true even in contracts containing
price-adjustment features, if these features are designed to deal only with
a certain magnitude and species of risk.80
Suppose, for example, that unforeseen circumstances increase a snp-
plier's costs of supplying a utility more than 100%, that the price-adjust-
ment feature fails to keep pace, and that the supplier faces severe losses
over the remaining term of the contract."' Suppose further that the sup-
plier acted reasonably; the losses are not attributable to the supplier's
own failure to bargain for an appropriate price formula, to stockpile in-
75. One court recognized the problem, stating that the "[ilntention of the parties' is a good
formula by which to square doctrine with result... [I]ntent... [when] discerable, must be
followed; but a certain sophistication must be recognized" where changed circumstances, the pas-
sage of time, and an inexact contract are involved. Parev Prods. Co. v. L Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124
F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
76. See Hillman, supra note 64, at 629-37, 650-55 (discussing the equities of cessation disputes).
77. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
78. See Speidel, supra note 4, at 393, 406.
79. See eg., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 13.3, at 968 (1973); see also
National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 109-10 (Ct. CI. 1964) (seller's acceptance
of fixed-price contract did not suggest that all risks were allocated to it), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962
(1965).
80. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
81. Some courts apparently have in part based their denial of relief to a supplier on the sup-
pliers gains from the disruption in other areas. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,
583 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979) (trial court allowed evidence
that seller experienced a threefold increase in the value of its coal reserves); Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 140 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (supplier took advantage of
"inflated market prices" in new contracts), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980). If the gains are unrelated to the particular contract, however, they
should not bar relief to a supplier. For example, there is little reason why an increase in the market
value of a suppliers reserves should be given, in effect, to the buyer by allocating to the supplier an
otherwise unallocated risk.
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ventories, to expand its supply sources, or to use less expensive methods
of production. In fact, suppose that the supplier's own sources of raw
materials all insisted on short-term agreements only. Because the partic-
ular risk of cost increases was unforeseen and because the supplier acted
reasonably and now faces calamitous losses, the situation appears ripe for
supplier relief under UCC section 2-615.82
The effect of cessation on the utility also needs to be considered,
however. The utility may have relied on a long-term supply of fuel by
building a new power station, by failing to oppose a long-term rate struc-
ture based on preinflation prices, 3 or by forgoing other market
opportunities.
The traditional approach to this problem is all or nothing: either
the supplier is excused 84 or the utility is entitled to performance under
the contract. Courts rarely favor the supplier in such cases. Instead,
they retreat to a "finding" that the supplier promised to perform and
therefore assumed the risk of even an oil embargo. 5 In reality, con-
fronted with the adage that courts should not make contracts for the
parties and with remedial inflexibility in the face of strong interests on
82. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977) provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with
paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence af a contingency the non-occur-
renc of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's capacity
to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his
option include regular customers riot then under contract as well as his own requirements
for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery
and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made
available for the buyer.
83. If the utility is able to pass on price increases to ratepayers and suffers no other harm (e.g.,
it did not build a new power station), the case may be ripe for a finding ofimpracticability in favor of
the supplier. No strong utility interest compels adjustment in these circumstances. The effect would
be that the utility would be required to purchase higher-priced fuel and consumers would pay more.
Professor Birmingham discussed such an approach in an analogous situation involving increased
costs of goods due to the Suez Canal closing. See Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal
Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20
HASTrINGS L.J. 1393, 1412-16 (1969).
84. Typically each party would b- entitled to restitution of any benefit conferred. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Gillette, supra note 12, at 522-23. But see
Trakman, Dinner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV.
471, 486-87 (1985) (courts have recognized that risk of change in conditions should not always be
allocated to the promisor).
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both sides, the court may simply opt for a facile solution.8 6
Does the all-or-nothing approach make sense? In a gap situation,
where the parties' agreement does not justify a refusal to adjust and
where both parties have strong contradictory interests, it would be better
to recognize a duty to adjust and enforce the duty through appropriate
remedies. First, an adjustment duty is even-handed. Both parties have
significant interests worthy of protection in a situation in which there is
little reason to favor either one completely.87 An adjustment duty also
avoids unexpected gain by one party at the cost of catastrophe for the
other,88 when neither is earned.8 9 Moreover, an adjustment duty helps
both parties ultimately to benefit from their contract.90 Finally, in an
atmosphere of flexibility and cooperation, an adjustment duty may reflect
what the parties would have agreed to at the time of contracting had they
addressed the problem of changed circumstances.91
H. COURT ADJuSTMENT
Assuming the court finds a duty to adjust and the parties have failed
to adjust, the question of fashioning an appropriate remedy confronts the
court. When the buyer's bad faith is the cause of the failure to adjust, 92
86. One critic aptly observed: "Dominated by our all-or-nothing notions of recovery, we have
almost totally ignored what would appear in many situations to be the eminently sensible split-the-
loss solution." Mueller, Contract Remedies Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
833, 837.
87. See Hillman, supra note 64, at 629-34, 650-55; Speidel, supra note 4, at 406. See generally
Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L.
REv. 750 (1964) (discussing the prospect and appropriate limitations on the imposition of settlement
on parties). A long-term contract can be viewed as a joint effort to enhance the wealth of both
parties. When a disruption occurs, the parties should attempt to minimize the harm to each other
and avoid returning to precontract adversarial positions. See Harrison, A Casefor Loss Sharing, 56
S. CAL L. REv. 573, 586-87 (1983) (returning to adversarial positions "largely ignores the mutual
reliance and consensual reciprocity inherent in contract").
88. Adjustment is therefore in accord with a norm emerging in contractual settings that one
party "should not knowingly cause harm to another without justification." Hillman, supra note 64,
at 619.
89. See Speidel, supra note 4, at 371, 405. It has been observed that "[t]he advantageous nego-
tiating position of the party seeking enforcement seems particularly undeserved when the parties
understood from the outset that flexibility was an integral part of their agreement." Comment,
Equitable Reformation of Long-Term Contracs--The "New Spirit" of ALCOA, 1982 UTAH L. REv.
985, 1003.
90. Adjustment is therefore consistent with the contract norm of reciprocity. See Hillman,
supra note 64, at 638-39.
91. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text. Professor Speidel points out that adjustment
also protects third-party interests. Speidel, supra note 4, at 411-12.
92. Like most duties relying on implied terms such as good faith, it is easier to describe imper-
missible rather than permissible buyer conduct. See ag., Summers, "Good Faith" in General Con-
tract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Untform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L REv. 195, 201 (1968).
The buyer, for example, may not refuse to negotiate at all except under unreasonable conditions,
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one approach would be to find that adjustment is an implied condition
precedent to the supplier's performance and to excuse the supplier.
Modeled after the general contract law approach to breaches of contract,
this response would be appropriate whenever the buyer's particularly un-
reasonable response to the exigent circumstances casts doubt on the
buyer's future satisfactory performance. Because determining whether
the buyer is acting in bad faith will often be very difficult-requiring the
court to weigh adjustment offers and other potentially ambiguous con-
duct of the parties-and because cessation is typically onerous and
wasteful, the court should rarely excuse the supplier.
A less severe approach would be to order the parties to engage in
good faith bargaining, mediation, or other dispute resolution tech-
niques.93 Such an order may prompt the parties to reach some reason-
able agreement. If the parties still do not reach agreement, or if the court
such as after a lengthy period of time during which the buyer reaps the benefit of market conditions.
See Farnsworth, On Not Getting to Yes Fair Dealing in Precontractual Negotiations and Under
Preliminary Agreements, 87 COLuM. L. REv. (1987) (forthcoming). See generally Knapp, Enforcing
the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 673 (1969) (arguing that parties' preliminary negotia-
tions may create contract to bargain which may be breached by later bad faith conduct); Speidel,
supra note 4, at 414-16, 415 n.187 (discussing court's role where advantaged party fails to negotiate
in good faith or refuses to accept equitable price adjustment). Nor may the buyer engage in negotia-
tion only as a subterfuge to delay the supplier's termination of performance. Thus a continuous
series of unreasonable adjustment offers-offers that would result in little or no improvement in the
suppliers position-would be bad faith. See id at 415 n.187. Consistent and immediate rejection of
the supplier's proposals would underscore this finding, see Farnsworth, supra, as would windfall
gains to the buyer during the "negotiation" period. Of course, a buyer's refusal to accept the sup-
plier's own unreasonable adjustment offers would not be bad faith. See Speidel, supra note 4, at 412.
Ultimately, the court must measure the parties' offers against its own view of what is fair adjustment.
Evaluation whether the buyer is acting in bad faith, therefore, may depend on the court's ability to
approximate a fair adjustment.
In addition, good faith also proscribes certain threats, such as threats to harm the supplier's
business reputation by informing others of the supplier's unreliability. Nevertheless, courts should
not dismember the bargaining power of a party. Thus, statements that the buyer will search for new
sources in the future should not alone evidence bad faith and a breach of the duty to adjust.
93. See Infra note 97. Much writing in the law reviews involves the proper roles of judges in
fostering settlement. I will not enter the fray. My goal is to show that when all else fails, court
adjustment should not be precluded. Articles discussing judicial methods of achieving settlement
include Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility 53 F.R.D. 129 (1971);
Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlement, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1363 (1984); Oes-
terle, Dangers of Judge-Imposed Settlements LTIGATION, Spring 1983, at 29; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982); Trakman, supra note 85; Wall, Schiller & Ebert, Should
Judges Grease the Slow Wheels of Justice? A Survey on the Effectiveness of rudicial Mediary Tech-
niques, 8 AM. . TRIAL ADvoc. 83 (1984); See also Symposium on Litigation Managemen4 53 U.
CH. L. REv. 305 (1986).
Some courts are willing to enforce agreements to negotiate in good faith to enter a formal
contract. See, eg., Arnold Palmer GolfCo. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 1976);
Thompson v. LUquichimica of Am., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 365, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Evans, Inc. v.
Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. 224, 238-39 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc.,
248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968).
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believes such an approach would be fruitless, 94 a third approach would
be for the court itself to adjust the contract.95
I do not dispute the proposition that a court is far from ideally
suited to adjust long-term contracts. Litigation costs time and money
and a judge can rarely make a better contract for the parties than they
could make for themselves.9 6 This does not mean, however, that courts
should not be allowed to adjust long-term contracts of parties who can-
not privately resolve their dispute. Rather, the shortcomings of court
adjustment only serve to emphasize that courts should be creative in en-
couraging the parties to settle.9 7 The discussion in this section, however,
assumes the court has failed to induce private settlement. In short, we
now confront the hard question: Is court adjustment ever appropriate
when the parties cannot reach agreement themselves?
A. Judicial Standards for Adjusting Long-Term Contracts.
Professor Dawson opposed court adjustment of long-term contracts
because he believed that courts lack sufficient standards to reshape the
contract to reflect what the parties should have agreed to ex post or what
they would have agreed to ex ante. In the absence of standards, the argu-
94. The attempt in Germany to create inducements for parties to renegotiate terms apparently
produced only delay or litigation over the fairness of proposals and the "obduracy" of responses.
Dawson, supra note 7, at 29-30.
95. For an analysis and evaluation of various methods of court adjustment, see infra notes 98-
166 and accompanying text.
The range of potential facts in long-term supply contracts and the range of possible court re-
sponses (termination, adjustment or specific performance) are not unlike a related cessation prob-
lem-that of the rights of an injured party after a breach. See Hillman, supra note 64, at 655-57.
The Second Restatement of Contracts offers a set of guidelines for determining when an injured
party must continue performing despite a breach, when an injured party may appropriately suspend
performance, and when an injured party may cancel the contract. See RESTA MENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcTS §§ 241-242 (1979). The Restatement's response to that problem is informative because
it illustrates the difficulty of drawing sharp lines in contract law and the need to offer the courts a
range of responses to reach sensible results.
96. Dawson, supra note 7, at 36. But Professor Dawson coneeded that parties are unlikely to
adjust voluntarily after initial breakdown. Id at 29-30 (German experience indicated that many
parties lacked incentive to renegotiate in inflationary period).
97. Such procedures include a judicial "suggestion" that the parties negotiate in good faith or
engage in extrajudicial dispute resolution processes such as mediation or a nonbinding mini-trial.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. In addition, Federal Rule
53 and similar state enactments authorize the court to refer the case or any part of it to an impartial
person such as a special master. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, Supra note
38, at 544-45.
Although an analysis of these and other procedures is beyond the scope of this article, I offer
one comment. Court efforts to induce settlement in the long-term contract setting should be immune
from the criticism that parties are deprived of their day in court. See Resnik, supra note 93. Be-
cause parties to long-term contracts typically expect cooperation and settlement of problems, induc-
ing settlement only helps the parties to do what they believe they should have done themselves.
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ment goes, a court enjoys unbounded discretion to create a new contract
for the parties. 93
Even Professor Dawson conceded that court adjustment may be ap-
propriate when the court does no more than extend party-agreed stan-
dards found in their contract.99 For example, he conceded that cases
involving partial excuse of installment contracts1oo and cases involving
reformation of the price of land sale contracts where the parties were
mistaken as to how many acres were sold 01 are examples of proper court
adjustment. Thus, Professor Dawson would limit court adjustment to
situations in which the existing contract offers sufficient guidance to per-
mit an adjustment that reflects the parties' reasonable expectations.
Although party-agreed standards in long-term contracts often offer
only an imperfect guide to expectations-after all, the parties typically
expect flexibility and cooperation and may have had no expectations at
all with respect to the current circumstances-the situation is far from
hopeless.10 2 The goal of court adjustment is to preserve the parties' pur-
98. See, ag., D. DOBBS, supra note 79, § 13.3, at 972.
99. See, ag., Dawson, supra note 7, at 4-23, 35. In fact, Professor Dawson also conceded that,
in the face of catastrophe, such as the uncontrolled inflation experienced by Germany in the 1920's,
court adjustment is appropriate even without clear standards. a at 1-2.
100. See, eg., id. at 4-9. Professor Dawson, however, emphasized the limited nature of this
adjustment:
When the Second Restatement speaks of courts granting remedies, where frustration has
occurred, on terms "such as justice requires," it offers illustrations [that] all involve a per-
formance whose insufficiency has been excused by some unforeseen event, with a residue
left that complies with the contract and will produce a result that is desired and useful. In
such cases what "justice requires" is that the performance or action of the other party be
scaled down or postponed and in all these cases if scaling down occurs it is accomplished
with a formula that was an agreed term in the original contract. To cancel the entire
transaction when these tests are met clearly would be unnecessary and wasteful; but partial
enforcement on such "terms" is far indeed from the pursuit of an ephemeral equity that is
now advocated by some authors, with the aim of manufacturing terms that are truly new
because uew circumstances would make them seem more just. For those who urge courts
to take on such missions the Second Restatement, I would say, offers no comfort at all.
Id. at 8-9.
101. Id. at 9-11. Professor Dawson also discussed cases in which a promisor did more than
required under the original contract, such as where a shipper took a longer route because hostilities
blocked the usual route. a at 13-17.
102. National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert denied, 380
U.S. 962 (1965), is often trotted out to support court adjustment. Professor Dawson referred to the
case as "incredible," but primarily for its finding on risk allocation. Dawson, supra note 7, at 18-21.
Regardless of the merits of that case, judicial authority in favor of adjustment concededly is still
weak in this country; one can, however, find at least some recent allusions to the possibility. See
supra note 5.
Some courts in other areas grant specific performance after supplying missing terms. For exam-
ple, in Ammerman v. City Stores Co., 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court granted specific
performance of an option to lease space to a major department store in a shopping center, id. at 956,
despite a lack of agreement on amount of space, cost per square foot, design, and other important
terms. See City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766,771 (D.D.C. 1967). The court referred
to the leases of other major stores in the same mall to fill the gaps. Ammerman, 394 F.2d at 956. As
Vol. 1987:1] LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
poses and to avoid unbargained-for gains by one party or losses by the
other. In situations ripe for adjustment, 03 the supplier sought an as-
sured market and cost coverage and the buyer sought an assured supply
at a reasonable price. 104 The parties did not intend to permit the supplier
to raise prices without a corresponding increase in its costs. Similarly,
the parties did not intend to permit the buyer to take advantage of an
exigent market situation by raising its own prices to third parties (such as
a utility increasing its rates or spot selling on the market), while at the
same time insisting on the supplier's performance at preinflation
prices.105
Within these broad parameters, more concrete guidance may be
available to help a court adjust the contract. For example, a court could
refer to other similar supply contracts formulated or adjusted under cur-
support, the court cited Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (holding option to buy
realty enforceable though terms were to be agreed upon subsequently); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Buster, 241 F.2d 178, 183 (10th Cir.) (enforcing agreement to supply "reasonable" quantity of gas at
"reasonable" price), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957); and Shoemaker v. American See. &Trust Co.,
163 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (implementing intent of testatrix when explicit terms of will
became impracticable). See afso McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594, 608-
09 (6th Cir.) (enforcing requirements contract and supplying term stating maximum amount to be
demanded), cert. dfmissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, 377 F.
Supp. 1215, 1219 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (supplying term stating time for ginning cotton by resort to
industry practice); Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 379-80, 259 P. 282, 285-86 (1927) (enforcing
renewal clause where rent was to be fixed by subsequent agreement); Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash.
285, 291-92, 209 P. 515, 517 (1922) (same); D. DoBBs, subra note 79, § 12.22, at 907-10 (discussing
specific performance for contractor's breach of building or repair contract); Van Hecke, Changing
Emphases in Spec ic Performance, 40 N.C.L. REV. 1, 13-16 (1961) (suggesting that "arbitration
[may] be resorted to as a means of bypassing the traditional inhibitions upou equitable specific per-
formance in building and construction contracts"). But see North Am. Fin. Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R.
Enters., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 691, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (refusing to enforce personal services contract
on public policy grounds); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105,
110-11, 417 N.E.2d 541, 544, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250 (1981) (refusing to enforce rent renewal clause
on ground that it was too indefinite).
103. See supra Part I.
104. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 531; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
105. In North Cent. Airlines v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court
reached a solution consistent with the parties' goals. There, the parties to a jet fuel supply contract
included a price-adjustment feature based on the "posted price" of crude oil, the material from
which jet fuel is refined. Id at 584. Increases in the posted price of the crude oil caused a propor-
tional increase in the price of jet fuel. When the adjustment term failed due to the imposition of
government price controls on crude oil that created two-tier pricing, one for "old" and one for
"new" oil, and thereby created two potential posted prices, the court concluded that the agreement
now had an open price term under UCC section 2-305(1)(c). Id at 592-93. The court stated that
the price should be based on the parties' intention "to establish an escalation clause which would
pass through some of the costs of the raw material by increasing the price of the refined product in a
definite relationship to any increase in the posted price of certain crude oil." Id at 593. It added
that the "underlying principle" was that "the price should be related to the underlying cost of crude
oil." Id. It therefore suggested that on remand the district court should set the price of jet fuel
based on the composition of old and new oil and the posted price for each. Id.
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rent conditions by the supplier or other contracting parties to determine
an appropriate pricing formula.10 6 Such models should not be difficult to
find. For example, all but two utilities agreed to adjust when a coal sup-
plier recently requested relief from over forty utilities.' 0 7 A court also
has the benefit of any party documents or statements concerning the pur-
pose of cost-adjustment features in the contract. For example, if the ad-
justment provision was intended to ensure coverage of the supplier's
costs plus a certain profit, a court could adjust the contract to ensure
such a result.'0 8 A court could also apportion allocated and unallocated
risks. If an oil embargo and safety regulations both cause a cost increase
but the parties allocated the latter risk to the supplier, the adjustment
should reflect only the former cause of the increase.10 9 Finally, a court
could refer to any settlement offers made by the parties.'10
Instead of focusing on the parties' expectations, a court could em-
ploy a restitutionary theory and base adjustment on the buyer's windfall.
Of course, the court must consider the parties' contract expectations
when deciding which gains are a windfall to the buyer. In some situa-
tions this may not be too difficult. For example, in Alcoa, the parties did
106. When courts believe the parties intended to contract, they unhesitatingly fill price gaps in
one of the following ways: (1) by referring to the market price as determined by the price the seller
was selling to others during the relevant time, see Pulprint, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 124
Misc. 2d 728, 731, 477 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1984); (2) by referring to the market price as
determined by the price generally applicable in the market area, see D.R. Curtis, Co. v. Mathews,
103 Idaho 776, 779, 653 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Ct. App. 1982); (3) by referring to a reasonable price
determined within the context of the whole agreement package, not necessarily limited to a prevail-
ing industry price or to seller markup to others in the trade, see Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers,
517 F.2d 214, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1975); North Cent. Airlines v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582, 588
(D.C. Cir. 1978); (4) by referring to trade publication price ranges, see TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 548-49 (6th Cir. 1931); or (5) by referring to course of dealing and usage of trade
under UCC sections 1-201(3) and 1-205, see Columbus Milk Producers! Coop. v. Department of
Agric., 48 Wis. 2d 451, 460-61, 180 N.W.2d 617, 621-22 (1970).
107. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
108. In Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa) v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980),
for example, the court found that the parties intended that Alcoa make a profit of between one and
four cents per pound. Mtd. at 58. A deficiency of cost-plus pricing is that it "gives the seller poorer
incentives to control costs, and requires that the parties devote more resources to monitoring per-
formance." Goldberg, supra note 18, at 533.
109. Of course, this may be too difficult to prove in some cases. See, eg., Iowa Elea. Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (refusing to adjust contract price
where impossible to determine share of increase attributable to unforeseen conditions), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
110. For example, in Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979), the coal supplier proposed a coal price of S10.60 per ton
and new price adjustment features including a gross inequity clause at a time that coal was selling for
$17.00 on the market and the buyer ws paying $7.83 per ton under the contract. The buyer coun-
tered with an offer of an increase of $1.00 per ton. Brief for Peabody Coal Co., supra note 43, at 23,
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not contemplate that Essex would spot-sell aluminum on the market."'
When Alcoa's costs increased, however, and the market price of alumi-
num dramatically rose, Essex began to do just that."? Arguably, all of
Essex's gain from such conduct was unjust enrichment. The problem
with a restitutionary approach, however, is that it would be difficult to
adjust the contract to account not only for the realized unjust gain, but
also for the future market fluctuations and other uncertainties that may
favor the supplier.' 13
A less ambitious approach would be to base adjustment on a reli-
ance theory modeled after the judicial response to the problem of termi-
nable-at-will franchise agreements. Some courts have held that
terminating a franchise agreement of indefinite duration is wrongful if
the franchisee has not had reasonable time to recoup its investment."14
Although the franchisee's remedy is often limited to damages,115 some
courts enjoin such wrongful terminations.11 6 Similarly, a court could en-
join a supplier from ceasing a long-term supply contract until the buyer
111. Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 58.
112. ML at 59.
113. See G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsnTUrIoN, § 13.9, at 56-61 (1978) (advocating adjust-
ment based on facts at hand, not on fixed formula, that would approximate the exchange the parties
originally had in mind).
114. See, ag., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1979) (franchise
relationship imposes duty not to terminate arbitrarily), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Clausen &
Sons, Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388, 390-91 (8th Cir. 1968) (13 years may be
reasonable time to recoup investment); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 NJ. Super. 357, 372-74, 294
A.2d 253, 261-62 (1972) (decision to terminate franchise depends on reasonable expectations of par-
ties), modified, 63 NJ. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 381, 390 A.2d 736, 743 (1978) (company could not arbitrarily
terminate franchise agreement); Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 73-74, 423 A.2d 713,
720-21 (1981) (corporation not allowed to violate franchisees reasonable expectations by terminat-
ing relationship).
115. The typical remedy is damages because specific performance would require "constant scru-
tiny," see Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 155 F.2d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 1946), or because
money damages are adequate. See I.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.
484, 496 (NJD. Cal. 1954).
116. The courts that enjoin franchise terminations usually do so on the basis of public policy, a
statute, or both. See, ag., California ARCO Distribs., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 158 Cal. App.
3d 349o 366, 204 Cal. Rptr. 743, 755 (1984) (remanding for determination whether unilateral modifi-
cations made by franchisor to franchise agreement warrant issuance of injunction under Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 455 So.
2d 404, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (airming permanent injunction against franchisor who failed
to reply within statutory period to franchisees proposal to transfer franchise; the statute was aimed
at correcting the "unequal bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees"), review denied,
462 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1985); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 NJ. Super. 357, 375-76, 294 A.2d 253,
263 (1972) (finding terminable-at-will franchise agreements to be void as against public policy), mod-
ified, 63 NJ. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). Some courts, however,
base their decision on estoppel. See, ag., Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 71-74,423 A.2d
713, 720-21 (1980) (newspaper estopped from terminating distributorships at will where distributors
detrimentally relied on newspaper's contrary representations); Gambar Enters., Inc. v. Kelly Servs.,
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had reasonable time to recoup its reasonable reliance expenses. Court
adjustment would be limited to the contract's duration term.
A concrete example helps to illustrate what buyer recoupment
might entail.' 17 Consider a utility that constructed a new power plant in
reliance upon a continuous supply of coal under a long-term contract.
The price of coal rises dramatically, the supplier refuses to deliver, and
the parties litigate. A court adjusting the contract should grant the util-
ity sufficient time to obtain an alternative source of supply for the plant
at a price reflecting current conditions, or if an alternative source is not
available, sufficient time to recover the costs of constructing the plant.
Thus, although recoupment sometimes may require a lengthy duration,
one should recall that in precisely such situations-i.e., costly buyer reli-
ance on a long-term supply contract-the supplier typically would get no
relief under current law.""
When the court bases adjustment on buyer recoupment, it could
also take into account the buyer's other contract commitments. For ex-
ample, if a utility agreed to a rate structure in reliance upon a supply
contract, the contract should continue long enough to enable the utility
to honor its commitments without a loss. Of course, the likelihood that
the buyer itself could obtain an adjustment of its commitments also
should be considered; for example, whether a utility could pass on cost
increases to ratepayers affects its true reliance on the contract.11 9
Like the expectation and restitutionary approaches to the problem
of adjustment, recoupment challenges the courts. Still, recoupment sim-
plifies the problem. It requires no new pricing formula that may fail to
reflect unanticipated future changes of conditions over a potentially long
period of time. Instead, recoupment alleviates the harshness to the buyer
of immediate termination, while it simultaneously acknowledges the sup-
plier's legitimate interests in cessation of the contract.
Alternatively, a court could base adjustment on recoupment, but in-
stead of ordering specific performance of the contract for a limited dura-
Inc., 69 A.D.2d 297, 305, 418 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (1979) (bad faith termination sufficient to sustain
cause of action).
117. In the franchise termination setting, courts typically award damages based on reasonable
expenses required or encouraged by the franchisor prior to a reasonable time after notice of the
termination, less profits earned. See, eg., Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 349 (3d Cir. 1984).
The franchisee often cannot recover lost future profits. See, ag., idt see also W.K.T. Distrib. Co. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 746 F.2d 1333, 1336 (8th Cir. 1984) (recovery of lost profits denied on ground
that recoupment is equitable doctrine intended to restore franchisee's lost investment). But cf Entis
v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1964) (wrongfully terminated sales agent
awarded recoupment, including compensation for money and effort invested to build the company's
business, for underpayment of commissions, and for lost sales commissions).
118. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 83 and accompanying text
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tion, the court could calculate a payment by the supplier necessary to
"buy-out" the contract.120 Although a court that has declared a contract
impracticable typically awards the buyer only restitution for any benefit
conferred on the supplier, the cash payment to the buyer could be based
on the buyer's reasonable reliance expenses. Such expenses would in-
clude, for example, losses associated with constructing a new power plant
or with agreeing to a fixed rate structure that cannot be recouped.1 21
This approach would require the court to calculate a precise money fig-
ure. For this reason, it is less attractive than limiting the contract dura-
tion; the latter approach allows the court to "hedge" with respect to the
ultimate matter of dollars and cents. 122
B. Judicial Competence to Adjust Long-Ter Contracts.
Some commentators argue that adjusting long-term contracts,
which requires determining whether risks were allocated, understanding
and applying complex accounting data, and foreseeing the future, is sim-
ply too complex for judges. These commentators believe that judges lack
both the parties' expertise concerning the subject matter and prior train-
ing or experience in creating contract terms.123 The argument is not
overly persuasive. The problem of complex cases is not unique to the
performance of long-term contracts. Consider, for example, the substan-
tive and remedial complexities of securities, patent, and antitrust cases.
The judicial incompetence argument casts doubt on our entire judicial
120. This is in accord with some of the franchise termination cases. See supra notes 115, 117
and accompanying text; see also Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d
131, 144-46, 638 P.2d 963, 974 (1981) (seller liable only for 4 of 15 years of contract because price
was to be "renegotiated," making additional damages speculative).
121. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The reliance interest is rarely protected in
excuse cases. See Harrison, supra note 87, at 581; see also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 272(2) (1979). But see Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 359, 57 N.E. 674, 674 (1900) (performing
party not at fault can recover for all work done when excused from performance). Instead, courts
have awarded only restitution for benefit conferred. 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1367-
1372 (1962 & Supp. 1984); Harrison, supra note 87, at 581.
Professor Harrison suggests splitting essential reliance losses. Id at 592-601. But his analysis is
not focused on the long-term supply setting and problems of increased cost of performance.
122. Another approach is loss splitting. See D. DOBBS, supra note 79, § 4.5, at 268-69; Coons,
supra note 87, at 766; Sharp, Promissory Liability. H, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 250, 269 (1940); Comment,
supra note 3, at 1056. For example, if a contractor spends $800 in reliance on a $10,000 contract to
build a garage, all of which is unsalvageable, and then the property is condemned, the owner could
reimburse the contractor for half of the reliance loss. A similar approach was adopted in National
Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. CL 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
The case is criticized in Dawson, supra note 7, at 18-21. Loss splitting seems viable for short-term
agreements, but would be difficult to administer in long-term supply contexts. For example, assum-
ing the supplier is excused, an issue arises whether the supplier's savings in not having to perform
over the duration of the agreement should be considered along with the buyer's reliance losses.
123. See, ag., Dawson, supra note 7, at 17-18.
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system. Furthermore, the argument erroneously impugns all judicial ad-
justment, and overlooks the practicality of a modest adjustment such as
specific performance for a limited duration or a cash buy-out designed to
recoup the buyer's reliance expense. 124
Doubtful also is whether alternative dispute resolution forums (or,
in extreme cases, the legislature) would be superior to judicial adjust-
ment. 125 Alternative dispute resolvers such as arbitrators or neutral
third parties are not inherently better qualified to resolve adjustment
problems. 126 Nor is the problem suited for a legislative solution. In pre-
cisely such a problem as this, flexible approaches are needed, approaches
that are geared to the particular facts and to the parties' idiosyncratic
interests.1 27
Commentators also ignore, or unfairly malign,128 the fact that a
judge has the benefit of hindsight. Hindsight provides judges with accu-
rate, current information that not only helps them to adjust the contract
to reflect present conditions, but also provides clues as to the likelihood
of future events. In addition, a judge can turn to special masters, magis-
trates, expert witnesses, and the parties and their lawyers for help in crys-
tallizing the potential remedies. 129 With such aid, a judge should be able
to reform the contract to reflect the parties' goals under new
circumstances.
Furthermore, even if a judge opts for a price adjustment rather than
a more modest approach, adjustment does not require the judge to alter
the fundamental nature of the parties' long-term agreement. Realisti-
cally, the agreement will continue to require flexibility and cooperation,
124. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
125. Cf Van Hecke, supra note 102, at 13-16.
126. For example, an "expert" arbitrator may be biased, or someone who is not an expert at all
may be picked to arbitrate. In addition, some ofthe informalities of arbitration may contribute to an
inequitable result. For example, arbitrators are free to dispense with formal rules of evidence, see
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES Rule 31 (American Arbitration Association 1980), the discov-
ery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, ag., Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose
Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1960), the doctrine of stare decisis as to previous arbitration
decisions, see M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBrrRATION 1 (1980), and even substantive
principles of law. See M. DoMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBriRATioN § 25:01, at 391 (rev. ed. 1984). For
a discussion of some of the shortconiings of arbitration, see Scott, supra note 18, at 139. Although
only anecdotal evidence, my experience as an arbitrator supports the assertions made in this
footnote.
127. See Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for
U.CC Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. RiEV. 1, 29 (1982).
128. See, eg., Dawson, supra note 7, at 36-37.
129. For example, the court can require the parties to assist it in fashioning relief by submitting
proposed orders and supporting briefs. In one case involving a covenant not to compete, the court
did just that. See Westee Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Westinghouse Ele. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 108, 127 (E.D.




and the new, judicially prescribed price formula may even require addi-
tional adjustment as circumstances change. In short, judges cannot do
more than the parties could do in allocating future risks, but judges
should do what can be done. Otherwise, the supplier suffers the entire
loss in a situation in which the parties agreed to adjust (the agreement
model) or in which there is little reason for placing the entire loss on
either party and fairness calls for sharing (the gap model). 30
C. Judicial Adjustment as a Restriction of the Parties' Autonomy.
Critics also argue that court adjustment restricts the parties' auton-
omy and, in effect, remakes the contract for the parties.13 1 But assume
that a court can approximate the adjustment the parties should have
made. 3 2 Under the agreement model, the parties reasonably expect ad-
justment; court adjustment is therefore a form of specific performance
that supports, rather than defeats, the parties' expectations.1 33
Similarly, court adjustment under the gap model does not impinge
on the parties' freedom because the parties have created no law to govern
their rights and duties. A buyer could, of course, enter a contract in
which the supplier expressly insures performance regardless of the cir-
cumstances. Or the supplier could expressly provide for release from the
contract under onerous circumstances (for example, when costs are equal
to or greater than the contract price). In such cases, iguoring the con-
tract allocation of risk would impinge on freedom of contract. But if
such an agreement was not made, neither party is contractually entitled
to any particular resolution of the problem when an unallocated risk
arises. Nevertheless, because the parties are joined in an enterprise that
encourages reliance and creates expectations, neither party should have
the unilateral right to insist on performance or to walk away from the
deal. 134 Of course, the parties are free after contract breakdown to agree
on a new approach to govern their affairs. The parties' failure to set their
own agenda at that time or at the time of initial contracting constitutes
130. Professor Schwartz has argued that the issues in impracticability cases are too difficult for
judges. See Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12, 19-20 (1976). But if the
issues are too complex for determining whether a supplier should be excused, they are also too
complex for determining whether the buyer is entitled to performance.
131. See Dawson, supra note 7, at 18 ("If the contract that was previously in force has through
frustration ceased to exist, how can the parties to it be compelled to accept a 'contract' that is
manufactured by a court to replace it?").
132. See supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
133. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 30, at 317-20.
134. See C. FRIED, supra note 74, at 21-22, 72 (contracting parties have limited obligation to
share losses caused by unexpected events); see also Coons, supra note 87, at 772-73 (losses by one
party which are not coupled with gain to the other party should be shared where both parties are
innocent of wrongdoing and occurrence is unanticipated).
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implicit consent to the court's intervention to adjust the agreement for
them.135
Although classical contract law typically decides cases involving as-
sertions of impracticability in an all-or-nothing fashion, it does not follow
that a supplier or buyer in a. true gap situation has the right to such a
determination. Because of informal planning or loose drafting and be-
cause of the lack of clarity of contract rules on the subject (When is a risk
foreseeable? When is performance impractical?), most true gap cases do
not fit neatly on one side of the impracticability line. In fact, one sus-
pects that in gap cases the issue of whether a supplier has a "right" to
cease performing or the buyer a "right" to specific performance turns on
the court's determination of whether the supplier would be hurt badly
enough by performance. 136 To argue that the supplier or buyer has a
"right" to a release or to performance, then, hinges upon a largely unsup-
portable belief in the clarity of contract rules in the true gap setting.137
A related argument against court adjustment is that it forces parties
to perform in an unhappy marriage that would be better terminated.
Parties in litigation have demonstrated their inability to perform without
a costly breakdown, the argument goes, and it is therefore unlikely that
they would do better in the future even under a more equitable arrange-
ment. Limiting adjustment to the duration term reflects this concern and
minimizes this problem. But if a court does opt to adjust the price, thus
removing an inequity in the agreement, perhaps the parties will do better.
In addition, the buyer need not be forced to perform under the adjusted
regime. The court could grant the buyer specific performance, condi-
tioned on the buyer's acceptance of the adjustment. 138 Thus the buyer
135. In Goetz & Scott, supra note 30, at 317, the authors refer to "indeterminate formulations"
in relational contracts, which "implicitly instruct the dispute-resolver to construe the contract
equitably."
136. See Hllman, supra note 64, at 652.
137. Professor Dawson complained that neither the Alcoa case nor Professor Speidel indicated
precisely when court adjustment was appropriate. See Dawson, supra note 7, at 31. My view, de-
rived from the reasoning in the text, is that such precision is impossible, at least within the gap
model. Under that model, one can say only that court adjustment is appropriate when a serious
disruption would cause the supplier calamitous losses, and, at the same time, the buyer asserts strong
interests in continued performance. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text; see also Hillman,
supra note 64, at 650-55.
138. See Dawson, supra note 7, at 32-33 (conditional decree is an "expedient with old and re-
spectable credentials"); Speidel, supra note 4, at 417 (conditional grant of specific performance is the
"most direct and least offensive" approach); see also Wooster Republican Printing Co. v. Channel
17, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 601, 621-22 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (ordering specific performance where perform-
ance was not impossible and buyer was willing to accept less than full performance), aff'd, 682 F.2d
165 (8th Cir. 1982); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647, 656 (D.S.C. 1969)
(granting specific performance where plaintiff agreed to reform of lease option); U.C.C. § 2-716(2)




would have the choice to either end the deal or accept performance of the
adjusted contract. The supplier should not be heard to complain if the
buyer chooses specific performance because the adjustment would largely
obviate the supplier's reasons for seeking a release in the first place.
Ultimately, the criticism that court adjustment is an impermissible
interference into the parties' freedom of contract fails to recognize that
courts under current doctrine often "make" contracts for the parties.
The UCC, for example, sets forth statutory gap-fillers, 139 instructs the
courts to carve up unconscionable contracts, 140 and authorizes orders of
specific performance under terms the court views as "just."141 In fact, a
UCC comment authorizes precisely the approach suggested in this arti-
cle.142 In addition, courts, using their equity powers, have a tradition of
adjusting contracts. For example, courts have long whittled away at cov-
enants not to compete, adjusting the duration, area, and substance of
such promises.143
D. Is Court Adjustment Bad Policy?
Is court adjustment an unsound approach on policy grounds? For
example, will it increase the cost of contracting (i.e., will it be inefficient)?
Will it promote disputes? Will it decrease the number of settlements of
disputes prior to or during litigation? Will it promote unfairness?
It is unlikely that the world is going to change very much from the
limited recognition of an adjustment duty and from some remedial flexi-
bility in the face of a party's unwillingness to adjust when the duty arises.
First, the change of approach is modest. The duty to adjust would arise
in few cases,144 and the remedy need not be dramatic. 145 In addition, in
139. Eg., U.CC §§ 2-308, 2-309 (1977).
140. Id § 2-302(1).
141. Id § 2-716(2).
142. Idk § 2-615 comment 6 ("In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either
answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of'excuse' or 'no excuse,' adjustment under the various
provisions of this Article is necessary. .. .'9. See also Haley, UCC § 2-615- Sharp Inflationary
Increases in Cost as Excuse From Performance of Contract, 50 NoTRE DAME LAW. 297, 307-08
(1974) (many situations exist "which are not quite so extreme as to constitute grounds for excuse but
where commercial standards and good faith require price adjustment"). For a history of the drafting
of section 2-615, see Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 79 CoM. LU. 75, 77 (1974) (suggesting that drafter sought to protect sellers through an "ex-
emption" that had become a "normal assumption" in commercial practice).
143. See, eg., Westee Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Westinghouse Blec. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 108, 126 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (reducing duration of covenant to 10 years, which was deemed a reasonable period for
protection of plaintiff); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 50-52, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754-55, 320
N.Y.S.2d 1, 5-7 (1971) (striking out contract restriction that defendant oral surgeon not practice
dentistry, where original restriction prevented defendant from practicing "dentistry and/or oral
surgery").
144. See supra notes 17-73 and aecompanying text.
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circumstances in which such a duty may arise, the parties could easily
avoid it by clear contract drafting.
Second, parties to long-term contracts frequently pay little attention
to contract rules.146 Instead, extralegal factors such as the need to pre-
serve the relationship or avoid the costs and delays of litigation control
the parties' conduct. 147 It is therefore unlikely that any adjustment rule
will have much effect on future behavior of the parties. 48 They simply
will continue doing what they have been doing. 49
Third, to the extent that a modest adjustment regime has anj effect
on the cost of contracting, that effect arguably will be salutary. The now
familiar efficiency argument maintains that the "superior risk bearer"
should suffer an unallocated loss, because the parties would have placed
the loss on that party had they allocated it.150 Because it reflects what
the parties would have done, such an alproach saves transaction costs-
future parties will not have to negotiate and draft around a different
rule-and therefore promotes allocative efficiency. 1'5 The superior risk
bearer is the party who is better able to insure against the risk and who
has greater information, knowledge, and experience in the particular
area.152 This party is in the best position to avoid the loss or insure
against it.'15
This efficiency theory does not apply to the agreement model be-
cause there is no gap to fill. Based on the parties' intentions, the agree-
ment includes an implied adjustment duty. Under the gap model, the
contract does not allocate the risk of the unforeseen event and does not
145. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
146. See, eg, White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions: An Aritfact of Twenti-
eth Century Business Life?, LAW QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Spring 1983, at 23.
147. See Harris & Veljanovski, Remedies Under Contract Law: Designing Rules to Facilitate
Out-ofCourt Settlements, 5 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 97, 107-09 (1983).
148. See Whitford, supra note 13, at 551-52.
149. The seminal work on this point is Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 24. See
also Palay, supra note 22, at 563 (parties sometimes protect themselves by developing a "private
ordering" of rules for maintaining an agreement); Palay, supra note 44, at 276-77 (parties often alter
contracts through unenforceable private agreements).
150. See Speidel, supra note 4, at 381-85.
151. See, eg., Posner & Rosenlield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic.Analyst, 6 3. LEGAL STUD. 33, 97-108 (1977).
152. See Id. at 90. But the facts of the Alcoa case suggest that identifying the party may be
impossible. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. Both Alcoa and Essex were huge indus-
trial enterprises with sophisticated managements. Both planned extensively for the deal. Which is
the superior risk bearer?
153. See Harrison, supra note 87, at 574. Obviously this approach may be criticized on many
grounds. See, eg., Speidel, supra note 4, at 396-400 (discussing limitations of efficiency analysis).
See generally Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations" Its Shortfalls and the Need for a
"Rich Classificatoy Apparatus, " 75 Nv. U.L. REv. 1018 (1981) (criticizing approach as too sim-
plistic and emphasizing that other discrete relations exist between contracting parties).
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contain an adjustment duty. The circumstances suggest, however, that
the parties would have included an adjustment duty if they had dealt
with the problem at the formation stage. They would not have placed all
the risk on one party.154 Parties will therefore incur costs contracting
around the harsh "superior risk bearer" rule, which may deter some par-
ties from entering contracts. Moreover, in light of the high termination
costs involved, we can assume that the parties would select a remedy that
would preserve the deal-not ensure its demise. Thus a rule recognizing
a potential adjustment duty and, ultimately, even the possibility of court
adjustment, may be more efficient and supportive of long-term
contracting.155
Determining the precise effect that court adjustment will have on
the parties' performance would require substantial empirical investiga-
tion; such investigation might tell us what approach to adjustment, if
any, helps to avoid disputes and leads to more and fairer party settle-
ments of disputes when they do occur. For now, I offer some prelimi-
nary observations.
When contract rules clearly define the parties' obligations, the par-
ties may be less likely to "test" the rules in adverse circumstances.: 56
Clear rules may thus facilitate performance and help avoid disputes.
Similarly, when a dispute does arise, clear rules that enable the parties to
determine their settling prices inexpensively may promote settlement.157
Whether a limited adjustment regime will lead to fewer disputes and
more settlements of disputes therefore may depend on the clarity and
certainty of the present legal approach as compared to an adjustment
approach. One can argue that court adjustment is less clear, affording a
court great discretion to decide when to adjust and how to adjust. But
the parties' bargaining setting and the contract's standards restrict a
judge's discretion.1: 8 In addition, the present impracticability approach,
although it typically ultimately favors the buyer, is itself confusing. Was
a risk allocated? What events were foreseeable? When is performance
sufficiently costly to be impracticable?15 9 If the agreement is not imprac-
ticable, is the buyer entitled to specific performance or to full expectancy
154. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text; see also Speidel, supra note 4, at 397.
155. See Speidel, supra note 4, at 390-400 (discussing the pros and cons of the efficiency
arguments).
156. Of course, the limited efficacy of contract remedies and the costs and delays of litigation
dull this point. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
157. See, eg., Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Proeedure and JudicialAdministraton, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973).
158. See supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.




To the extent that court adjustment is less certain than the current
approach, another view is that this may favor party settlement. Uncer-
tain court adjustment may induce parties to settle their disputes, just as
some parties settle to avoid the uncertainties of a jury verdict. Under this
view, court adjustment is "a form of coercive mediation."161
Despite the long odds against winning a complete release from any
duty to perform, the existing all-or-nothing approach of impracticability
may actually encourage suppliers to cease performance and refuse settle-
ment. The hope for a complete release may explain, for example, why
the dispute between Westinghouse Electric and operators of forty-nine
nuclear power plants concerning Westinghouse's agreement to supply
uranium to the plants was not settled prior to a court decision.162 West-
inghouse had agreed to supply uranium to the plants at up to twelve
dollars a pound, but the market price then rose sharply to over forty
dollars a pound. Westinghouse projected its losses at over two billion
dollars. After a decision that Westinghouse was liable for expectation
damages, the utility owners of the plants agreed to settle under "ex-
tremely lenient terms."16 3 Presumably the utilities would have been will-
ing to settle under terms at least as favorable to Westinghouse prior to
incurring all of the costs of litigation. This suggests that Westinghouse
must have held out, hoping to win a complete release from its duties
under the contract.
Although the effect of a limited court adjustment approach on the
frequency of party disputes and settlements may be unclear, 1' the qual-
ity of settlement is likely to improve. In cases ripe for adjustment,
neither party will be able to assert bargaining leverage because each will
160. See Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 19,28-29 (1981) ("An articulated compro-
mise rule could make lawsuits less of a gamble... [and] unpredictability in outcome would not be
appreciably worse than under the present system of seemingly rigid, but actually bendable, rules."
(quoting Simon & Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the
Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1395, 1436 (1979))).
161. Macaulay, supra note 5, at 476. See also P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 119
(1986); Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Caser The Agent Orange Example 53 U.
Cm. L. REv. 337, 346 n.30 (1986) (finding "a strong positive relationship between uncertainty of
outcome and settlement" in Agent Orange litigation). Thus, although we may seek certain rules to
govern commercial affairs for many reasons, promoting settlement may not be one of them.
162. See Dawson, supra note 7, at 25-26.
163. IA4 at 25.
164. At least one judge believes court adjustment can "best maintain the integrity of the long-
term contractual relationship" when interparty negotiation fails to lead to a fair outcome. McGinnis
v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 779 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, 3., concurring).
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know that the court is unlikely to decide totally in its favor. 165 This is
especially important in the long-term contract setting where the parties
typically make significant investments in the contract, where there are
few market alternatives and, thus, where the party favored by the ex-
isting approach may take advantage of its bargaining leverage to extract
significant concessions. 166
In conclusion, even ff a court adjustment regime marginally in-
creased disputes and marginally decreased settlements, it would not nec-
essarily be undesirable. Avoiding disputes or maximizing the settlement
rate ultimately may be less important than implementing a just method
of resolving disputes. In short, the benefits of court adjustment in terms
of fairness to particular parties may outweigh any costs such as dimin-
ished settlement of disputes. In fact, at the margin perhaps a fair resolu-
tion of disputes maximizes the benefits to society of long-term contracts
by encouraging people to enter into them.
I. CONCLUSION
I neither argue that court adjustment is always proper, nor that par-
ties cannot contract out of it. Court adjustment, however, is appropriate
in some circumstances that are sufficiently identifiable. The "relational"
realities of modern-day, long-term contracting suggest that when an un-
anticipated disruption causes calamitous losses to a party, a duty to ad-
just may arise. Further, ff the court finds a duty to adjust, the court can,
in some circumstances and often in modest ways, adjust the contract for
the parties. Although these "relational" facts support the recognition of
an adjustment duty, this does not mean that we must find a radical, new
way of looking at contract.1 67 We must only pay closer attention to the
more accurate factual premises of the relational view as seen in business
practice, and we must be willing to show greater courage in fashioning
appropriate remedies.
165. See Harris & Veljanovski, supra note 147, at 110-11; Harrison, supra note 87, at 595-97;
Comment, supra note 89, at 1003. Of course, if one party is more risk-averse than another, this may
affect the observation made in the text.
Professor Macaulay observes that business persons often resort to the courts because they hope
to improve their bargaining position, not because they believe the courts will lead to ajust resolution
of the dispute. Macaulay, supra note 43, at 515. See also Gordon, supra note 24, at 572 (discussing
Macaulay's view that private parties resort to courts for opportunistic and tactical reasons).
166. See supra notes 22-24, 39 and accompanying text.
167. "[O]ne can be a soldier in the relational contract army without urging a repudiation of
existing doctrine." Kidwell, A Caveat, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 615, 621-22.
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